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Abstract
This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China over
the ten years to 2006. Using a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index estimates of
productivity growth are constructed with appropriate confidence intervals. The paper
adjusts for the quality of the output by accounting for the non-performing loans on the
balance sheets and test for the robustness of the results by examining alternative sets
of outputs. The productivity growth of the state-owned banks is compared with the
Joint-stock banks and it determinants evaluated. The paper finds that average
productivity of the Chinese banks improved modestly over this period. Adjusting for
the quality of loans, by treating NPLs as an undesirable output, the average
productivity growth of the state-owned banks was zero or negative while productivity
of the Joint-Stock banks was markedly higher.
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21.  Introduction
Banking efficiency and banking reform is a vogue topic among Chinese
scholars. Banking sector reform in China, which has been a gradual and on-going
process since 1978, has provided Chinese researchers with ample material for the
study of efficiency dynamics in banking. A further stage of reform was announced in
1993 with the objective of creating an efficient and commercial banking sector.
Following the conditions of the WTO, in theory the Chinese banking market has been
open to foreign competition since the end of 2006. Chinese banks have also been
encouraged to allow foreign banks and investors to take minority shareholding
positions. The listing of three of the big four banks on the international exchange
during 2006-7 has been heralded as a financial success not only because of the
injection of foreign capital but also foreign managerial expertise to improve bank
management, performance and productivity. Given the acceptance strategic
investment by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks; it is no surprise that
bank efficiency in China has become a popular topic of research in recent years.
There have been a number of studies of banking efficiency that have been
published in Chinese scholarly journals1, but to date only a few studies are available
to non-Chinese readers2. The gradualist reforms of the banking sector and the
potential of foreign competition is expected to improve efficiency and productivity in
the banking sector. Signs of improvement in the Chinese banking sector have
included improved profitability and declining non-performing loans and objective
evidence of improved performance has begun to emerge3.
                                                
1 For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue and Yang, (1998) and
Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while Liu and Song (2004), Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Sun (2005) and Qian
(2003) have used parametric methods.
2 A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric methods by Fu and
Heffernan (2005)
3 See Fu and Heffernen (2006) and Matthews et al (2007a) (2007b)
3This paper examines the productivity of the nationwide banks in China using
the Malmquist index approach for the period 1997-2006. The Malmquist index has
the advantage of being able to decompose productivity growth into technological
change, which captures any expansion in the production frontier, from efficiency
improvement, which captures the movement towards the efficient frontier. The
Malmquist index is constructed within the framework of Data Envelope Analysis
(DEA), which in turn is a non-parametric linear programming method that applies
observed input and output data to create a best practice frontier. A problem with the
use of DEA is that it assumes the data is not a sample generated from a distribution.
Therefore the data captures the true production set with deterministic certainty.
This research has three objectives. First, it aims to measure the productivity of
the nationwide operating banks in China using four different models specifying the
production technology of inputs and outputs. Second, it considers non-performing
loans as an undesirable output. Third, it addresses the problem of inference inherent in
the use of DEA as a measure of relative performance. The main drawback of the DEA
approach is that it assumes the inputs and outputs are measured without error and
therefore do not permit statistical evaluation. This paper provides an inferential
capability to the point-estimates of productivity through the use of non-parametric
bootstrapping methods.
The results are that the 4 state owned banks showed either no productivity
growth or even productivity regress over the decade 1997-2006. Three out of the four
models show that the JSBs outperformed the SOBs in terms of total factor
productivity growth driven largely by technological progress. The econometric
analysis indicates that productivity growth was negatively associated with the size of
4the bank. The revenue mix measured by the share of non-interest income in total
revenue was positively related to productivity growth.
This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section outlines the
background to the Chinese banking system. Section 3 discusses the methodology and
literature relating to the Malmquist method of estimating bank productivity. Section 4
presents the banking data. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.
2. Chinese Banking
In 2006, the Chinese banking system consisted of 19,797 institutions,
including 3 policy banks, 4 large state-owned commercial banks (SOB), 12 joint-
stock commercial banks (JSB), 113 city commercial banks (CCB), 14 locally
incorporated foreign bank subsidiaries and the rest made up of urban and rural credit
cooperatives and other financial institutions.
Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the
banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below
shows that the ratio of total bank assets to GDP has increased from 126%, in 1997, to
206% in 2006. The market remains is absolutely dominated by the four state owned
banks, although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through
competition from the other commercial banks (JSB and CCB).
5Table 1: The Chinese banking Market
Variable 1997 2000 2006
Total Assets to
GDP
125.6% 147.1% 205.8%a
SOB Employment 1,394.8 thousand 1,4936.3 thousand 1,336.8 thousand
SOB Market share
% assets
88.0% 71.4% 51.0%
NPL ratio SOB
only
52.7% 31.5% 9.3%
ROAA SOB* 0.93% 0.78% 0.67%
NIM SOB* 1.8% 1.5% 2.5%
Cost-Income Ratio
SOB*
48.2% 59.6% 43.3%
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Individual Bank Annual Accounts, China Regulatory
Banking Corporation website, Almanac of Chinas Finance and Banking, Fitch-Bankscope data base,
National Bureau of Statistics of China, * weighted average by asset share, a estimated
Return on average assets (ROAA) and net-interest margins (NIM) of the SOBs are
respectable by Western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent
with economies in the same stage of development (as for example India where NIM
would be in the region of 3.5%). Part of the problem is that interest rates were heavily
controlled during this period and partly the large amount of non-performing loans on
the books of the commercial banks. However, the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio
of the SOBs has been falling, from 53% in 1997 to 9% in 2006.
With the encouragement of the regulatory authorities, Chinese banks have in
recent years, had to restructure their balance sheet, develop modern risk management
methods, improve capitalization, diversify earnings, reduce costs and improve
corporate governance and disclosure4. Faced with the potential of increased
competition from the end of 2006, the commercial banks have begun the process of
restructuring and reducing unit costs. Employment in the state-owned banks has
declined in recent years and the major banks have worked to reduce costs as shown in
the reduction in the average cost-income ratio.
6 Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the
government and its agencies5. Under state control, the banks in China served the
socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference
rather than commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial
institutions were allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of
individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution6, the pressure
to reform management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and
reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. Table 1A of Appendix
A shows the extent of foreign ownership of individual banks.
The theory of market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent
banks will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in
preparation for the threat of entry. Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency, and
strong productivity improvements between the periods 1997 and 2006, with marked
improvements in the latter years.
3. Methodology and Literature
This section outlines the methodology and reviews the literature on the
measurement of bank productivity in general and China in particular. Data Envelope
Analysis can be used to evaluate the efficiency of a firm by comparing it with a best
practice or output efficient firm. An output efficient firm is one that cannot increase
its output unless it also increases one or more of its input, whereas an output
inefficient firm is one that can increase its output without increasing its inputs. An
output efficient firm would have a score of 100% as being located on the output
                                                                                                                                           
4 CBRC Annual Report 2006 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/index.jsp
5 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the
government in 1995.
7efficient frontier whereas an output inefficient firm would be inside the frontier and
have a score of less than 100%. Similarly an input efficient firm is one that cannot
reduce its inputs without reducing its output whereas an input inefficient firm can.
The major drawback of the DEA approach is that the efficiency scores
obtained from a particular sample are confined to that particular sample and cannot be
compared with another sample in a different time period. This limitation does not
allow the measurement of productivity growth, which allows for improvement in
efficiency as well as technical progress.
The idea of comparing the input of a decision making unit over two periods of
time (period 1 and period 2) by which the input in period 1 could be decreased
holding the same level of output in period 2 is the basis of the Malmquist Index7. Färe
et al. (1994) developed a Malmquist productivity measure using the DEA approach
based on constant returns to scale. The Malmquist productivity index (M) enables
productivity growth to be decomposed into changes in efficiency (catch-up) and to
changes in technology (innovation)8.  Briefly, for a vector of inputs {x} and vector of
outputs {y}, for each time period {t} the production set }{ tS  describes all feasible
input-output pairs at a given time such that;
}),(:max{ ttttt Syxyy ∈= (1)
However, observed output at any point of time }{ ty  may not correspond to the
maximum potential output for given input }{ tx .The appropriate method of accounting
for the discrepancy between actual and potential maximum output (technical
                                                                                                                                           
6 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single investor, except in the case of
joint-venture banks
7 Grosskopf (2003) provides a brief history of the Malmquist productivity index and discusses the theoretical and empirical
issues related to the index. For the decomposition of Malmquist productivity index, see Lovell (2003).
8 A further decomposition can be conducted by separating the change in efficiency into the change in pure efficiency x change in
scale efficiency. The change in efficiency is constructed under CRS while the change in pure efficiency and scale efficiency is
constructed under VRS. See Ray and Desli (1997)
8inefficiency) is the output distance function of Shephard (1970) or Färe (1988)
defined as;
( ) { }tttttt Sxyxyd ∈= ),(:inf, θθ (2)
An illustration using the one input one output case is shown in Figure 1B of
Appendix B. To construct the Malmquist productivity index we need to specify the
distance function for two adjacent time periods. So for period {t+1} the distance
function is defined as;
( ) { }111111 ),(:inf, ++++++ ∈= tttttt Sxyxyd θθ (3)
The Malmquist index (M) of total factor productivity change is the geometric
mean of the two output distance function ratios based on the technology for periods
t+1 and t respectively.  In other words:
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In their study of productivity growth in industrialised countries, Färe et al (1994)
decompose (4) for changes in efficiency (catch up) and changes in frontier technology
(innovation). This can be seen by expressing (4) as:
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where
M = the Malmquist productivity index
9Et+1 = a change in relative efficiency over the period t and t+1
Tt+1 = a measure of technical progress measured by shifts in the frontier from period t
to t+1
When M > 1 it means that there has been a positive total factor productivity
change between period t and t+1. When M < 1 it means that there has been a negative
total factor productivity change.
The choice of the variables for the input and output vectors is invariably a
contentious issue in the banking literature. The literature typically identifies two
approaches, the intermediation approach and the production approach. The
intermediation approach is based on the principal function of the bank as a financial
intermediary which raises deposits and transforms these into earning assets such as
loans and other earning assets. In this approach outputs are typically interest earning
assets (loans and securities) while deposits along with labour and physical capital is
treated as inputs.
With the production approach, banks are viewed as producers of financial services
associated with individual loan and deposit accounts. These services are produced by
utilising physical capital and labour. In this approach the number of accounts of
different loan and deposit categories and the number of transactions is taken as
measures of outputs. In reality it is difficult to obtain data on the number of accounts
and number of transactions in a given time period. In practice scholars adopt the
value-added approach of Berger and Humphrey (1991) in which the real values of
corresponding balance sheet items are used as measures of outputs. Therefore in this
approach loans, other earning assets and deposits will be viewed as outputs while
labour and physical capital is used as the inputs (for example Berg et al, 1992  below).
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The use of the Malmquist method of evaluating productivity performance of
banks has been a growth area of academic enquiry. Berg et al (1992) examined
Norwegian banks 1980-89 and found productivity regress prior to deregulation and
strong productivity gains due to catch-up after deregulation. They use the variant of
the production approach that had long term loans, short term loans and deposits as
measures of output. The Malmquist decomposition was used by Wheelock and
Wilson (1999) to examine bank productivity in the USA for the period 1984-93.
Using the intermediation method they separate deposits into demand deposits (non-
interest paying) and other deposits (interest paying) with the latter used as an input
and the former an output. They report a general drop in average productivity caused
by failure to catch-up with outward shifts of the production frontier.  Alam (2001)
found that the deregulation period resulted in a productivity surge in the first half of
the 1980s followed by a productivity regress in the second half for large US banks.
These results were confirmed by Mukherjee et al (2001) who also use panel
estimation to explain productivity growth in terms of bank size, product-mix and
capitalisation.
Other studies of bank productivity using the Malmquist method have been Drake
(2001) for the UK, Grifell-Tatjéand Lovell (1997) for Spain, Canhoto and Dermine
(2003) for Portugal, Noulas (1997) for Greece and Isik and Hassan (2003) for Turkey.
A pan-European study was conducted by Casu et al (2004) who compare parametric
with the Malmquist method. There finding is that productivity growth in European
banking has been largely brought about by technological change rather than efficiency
improvement. Outside Europe, Worthington (1999) found that Australian Credit
Unions exhibited strong technological progress after deregulation and Neal (2004)
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found that productivity improvements were mostly shifts in the frontier with the
majority of banks having negative catch-up over 1995-99.
A number of studies of the productivity of Chinese banks have been conducted by
Chinese scholars but with little consensus in the findings.  Chen (2002) uses the
production method for the period 1994-2000 and finds that productivity growth was
dominated by efficiency gains over technological improvements. In contrast Ni and
Wan (2006) examine much the same panel of state-owned and joint-stock commercial
banks in the period 1998-2002 and find an increasing trend in productivity driven by
technological improvement with the joint-stock commercial banks showing a faster
growth than the large state-owned banks. Both studies use almost the same measures
of output but differ in inputs9 which may explain the difference in findings.
Tan and Wang (2006) and Hou (2006) use the intermediation method whereby
deposits are part of the input set, to study the periods 1997-2003, and 1996-2002
respectively. Tan and Wang measure outputs by gross income and profit and finds
that overall efficiency decreased over the period and only towards the end of the
period did total factor productivity improve. The main driver of TFP was growth in
technical progress. This basic finding was also confirmed by Hou (2006) who
explained technological progress using panel estimation methods in terms of bank
specific and environmental factors. Zhang and Wu (2005) use a mixture of the
intermediation and production methods to study the periods 1999-2003. Output is
measured by profit and customer deposits while inputs are physical assets, labour and
non-deposit loanable funds. They find that efficiency change (catch-up) dominated
technological progress in explaining the growth in TFP. However, the main
                                                
9 Chen (2002) uses physical assets and operating expenses as inputs while Ni and Wan (2006) add the
number of branches and number of employees to the input set.
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improvements in technology were accrued to the state-owned banks whereas in the
main catch-up was in the joint-stock commercial banks.
Sun and Fang (2007) pose the question whether the existence of foreign banks in
China have stimulated increased productivity and efficiency in domestic banks. They
use the value-added variant of the production approach to study the 1996-2004 period.
Inputs were taken as interest expenses, operational expenses and total assets, and
interest income, non-interest income and profit were taken as output. Their finding
was that productivity growth occurred only in the 2001-2004 period and concludes
that the impact of foreign banks was not significant.
Table 2 below provides a non-comprehensive summary of the studies on banking
productivity performance in China and the rest of the world. The one common finding
of the Chinese studies was that the average productivity performance of the joint-
stock commercial was greater than the average performance of the state-owned banks.
In all other respects there is little consensus as to whether TFP was driven by
technological progress (frontier shift) or efficiency gains. Partly this was may have
been due to the relatively small sample employed (typically the 14 national banks),
partly to differences in the set of inputs and outputs used but importantly none of the
studies employed a bootstrap methodology to provide an inferential capability that
provided statistical significance.
The application of bootstrapping methods to the Malmquist productivity index is
an ongoing area of research (Lőthgreen and Tambour, 1999). Relatively few studies
have applied bootstrapping methods to measure banking productivity. Gilbert and
Wilson calculate confidence intervals for estimates of productivity in Korean banks in
1980-94 and conclude that the period had experienced significant productivity growth
against the null hypothesis of no change between periods. Tortosa-Ausina et al
13
(2008), apply bootstrapping to Spanish savings banks over 1992-1998 and confirm the
common finding that productivity growth is dominated by technological progress in
the post deregulation period. Murillo-Melchor et al (2005) conduct a European wide
study of bank productivity over the period 1995-2001 using bootstrap techniques.
They confirm the basic finding of Casu et al (2004) that productivity gains were
driven by technological progress but find significant differences in inter-country
performance10.
Under the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs, and liabilities
measure inputs whereas the production approach recognises that the bank provides
intermediation services and payment services to depositors. In the production
approach, physical entities such as labour and capital are inputs while deposits are a
measure of output. Goldschmidt (1981) argues that deposits are both inputs and
outputs depending on its use in intermediation services or payments services and
suggests a weighting mechanism similar to the divisia mechanism of Barnett (1984).
Such a separation would need information about the term maturity of deposits. This
information is not easily available for banks in China and in any case up until very
recently deposit interest rates were regulated and did not reflect market fundamentals.
This study adopts a mixture of models that blend both the intermediation and
production methods to test the robustness of the measures of bank productivity.
                                                
10 Alam (2001) also uses bootstrap confidence intervals to provide an inferential capacity to the point
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Table 2: Summary of Studies on bank productivity
Study Country Period Inputs Outputs Results
Berg et al (1992) Norway 1980-89 Labour hours,
operational
expenses
deflated by
materials price
index
Short-term loans,
long-term loans,
deposits and loan
losses treated as
negative output
Low TFP growth but strong catch-
up following deregulation. Big
banks had stronger productivity
growth than smaller banks.
Wheelock and
Wilson (1999)
USA 1984-93 Labour,
physical capital,
purchased
funds
Four categories of
loans, demand
deposits
Decline average productivity over
the period. The benchmark banks
improved technical productivity
through technical innovation but
average efficiency declined.
Alam (2001) USA 1980-89 Two categories
of deposits,
other purchased
funds, capital,
labour, equity.
Securities, three
categories of
loans.
Lag in effect between regulatory
reform and growth in productivity.
Improvements in productivity
obtained from technical innovation
rather than efficiency gains.
Mukherjee et al
(2001)
USA 1984-90 Labour,
physical capital,
equity, two
categories of
deposits.
Three categories
of loans,
investments, non-
interest income
Productivity growth of large banks
was generally positive in this
period but productivity growth
fluctuated with respect to size.
Drake (2001) UK 1984-95 Physical
capital, labour,
(deposits)
Loans, Other
investments, Non-
interest income,
(deposits)
Uses both intermediation and
production methods. Productivity
growth driven by technical
progress. Slower TFP under the
intermediation approach.
Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell (1997)
Spain 1986-93 Labour, non-
labour
operating
expenses
Loans, Savings
deposits, demand
deposits (all
deflated by price
index)
Savings bank productivity driven
by technical progress and catch-
up.  Commercial bank productivity
declined in latter half of period.
Canhoto and
Dermine (2003)
Portugal 1990-95 Labour,
physical capital
Loans, deposits,
securities,
interbank
assets/liabilities
Strong technological progress
following deregulation. Catch-up
weakened as benchmark banks
grew strongly.
Noulas (1977) Greece 1991-92 Labour,
physical capital,
deposits
Liquid assets,
loans, investments
State owned banks experienced
faster TFP than private banks.
Catch-up was faster in private
banks. State-owned banks
experienced stronger technical
progress
Isik and Hassan
(2003)
Turkey 1981-90 Labour,
physical capital,
deposits
Short-term loans,
long-term loans,
other earning
assets, non-interest
income
Productivity loss 1982-86.
Productivity growth 1987-90.
Strong catch-up in 1987-90
following deregulation but low
technical progress.
Casu et al (2004) Europe 1994-00 Wage
bill/Assets,
deposits,
physical capital
Loans, other
earning assets,
non-interest
income.
Productivity growth supported by
technological progress rather than
efficiency gains, except in the UK
where catch-up was stronger.
Worthington
(1999)
Australia 1993-97 Labour,
physical capital,
non-deposit
liabilities
Demand deposits,
time deposits,
three categories of
loans, other
investments
Technological regress but high
variability within credit unions.
Technical progress occurred after
deregulation. Efficiency gains due
to technical efficiency rather than
scale efficiency.
Chen (2002) China 1994-99 Physical assets,
operating
expenses
Deposits, loans,
profit
Technological regress but strong
catch-up drives TFP. JSB
exhibited higher TFP variation
Ni and Wan
(2006)
China 1998-02 Labour,
physical assets,
branches, op
expenses
Deposits, loans, op
revenue
Positive TFP. Joint stock banks
more productive than SOB.
Productivity growth driven by
technical progress.
Tan and Wang
(2006)
China 1997-03 Labour,
physical assets,
deposits
Profit, gross
income
TFP growth negative until final
year, driven by technological
regress. Efficiency improvements
Hou (2006) China 1996-02 Deposits,
physical assets,
op. expenses
Interest earnings,
non-interest
earnings
Declining trend in technical
efficiency. TFP driven by
technological progress
                                                                                                                                           
estimates of productivity of large US banks.
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Zhang and Wu
(2005)
 China 1999-03 Labour, non-
deposit funds
Deposits, Profits TFP driven by efficiency catch-up.
SOBs driven by technical progress
Specifically, we consider four types of models. Model 1 is one where there are
two inputs, the number of employees (LAB), and fixed assets (FA) and four outputs,
total deposits (DEP), total loans (LOANS), other earning assets (OEA), and non-
interest income (NII). In this respect Model 1 is based on the production approach of
Berger and Humphrey (1991) but following Casu et al (2004), Isik and Hassan
(2003), and Drake (2001) we include non-interest income as an output. Although non-
interest income remains undeveloped in China, it is selected to reflect the growing
contribution of this area to banks total income. Model 2 is one where there are 3
inputs (LAB, FA, DEP) and three outputs selected under the conventional
intermediation approach (LOANS, OEA, NII).
Following Park and Weber (2006)11, we also separate desirable from
undesirable outputs. Park and Weber (2006) consider loans less non-performing loans
(NPLs) as well as deposits as a valid output of the bank in their study of bank
productivity in Korea, where NPLs are viewed as an undesirable output. Park and
Weber found that adjusting loans for NPLs accentuated the general finding that
technical progress outstripped efficiency regress in Korea.
Subtracting non-performing loans from the stock of loans for each bank
creates a new output variable (LOANSQ) which replaces total loans in models 1 and 2
to create models 3 and 4 respectively. Another argument for adjusting loans for NPLs
is to mitigate the effect of the large loan portfolios held by the big-4 SOBs on the
efficiency calculation. The unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the efficiency score
upwards for the SOBs which have the largest share of loans but also the highest
proportion of NPLs. To our knowledge this has not been previously examined in the
Chinese context.
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4. Banking data
This study employs annual data (1997-2006) for 14 banks; four state-owned banks
(SOB), and ten national joint-stock commercial banks (JSB). Data for one of the joint-
stock banks was unavailable for 2004 - 2006 (China Everbright); and in those years
13 banks data were used. The total sample consisted of 137 bank-year observations.
The main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope. Other sources were individual
annual reports of banks and the Almanac of Chinas Finance and Banking (various
issues). The choice of banks was based on the fact that they face a common market
and compete nationwide.
 The availability of uniform and comparable data on Chinese banking is a very
recent development. Researchers have typically made a number of working
assumptions to fill the gaps in data. In general, balance sheet data are available
although the data revisions alter the figures from year to year and up until recently the
accounting standards of Chinese banks differed from international standards (Ng and
Turton 2001). Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for
the full sample 1997-2006 as an indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high
standard deviation and the range of the figures is an indication of the dominance of
the 4 state owned banks. Since we are examining the movements in productivity over
a period of nine years, the nominal values of data were deflated by the consumer price
index.
                                                                                                                                           
11 See also Berg et (1992)
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Table 3: Output-Input Variables 1997 - 2006 (million RMB) per bank/year
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max
LOANS
RMB mill
Total stock
of loans
721175 935119 5915 3533978
OEA
RMB mill
Investments 472282 690894 9198 3790661
NII
RMB mill
Net Fees and
Commissions
1730 3400 -3386 16344
LOANSQ
RMB mill
Loans less
NPLs
568421 762874 1290 3400040
LAB Total
Employed
112119 170526 1186 541525
DEP
RMB mill
Total stock
of Deposits
1157869 1548240 16522 6802964
FA
RMB mill
Fixed assets 21409 29099 356 112272
 Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various) and author calculations
from web sources.
The choice of input data is well established in the literature and draws
precedence from the work of Drake (2001), Canhoto and Dermine (2003), Noulas
(1977), Isik and Hassan (2003) and Tan and Wang (2006). The choice of outputs is
conventional in so far as loans and other earning assets are commonly specified in the
banking literature. However, the inclusion of non-interest earnings as an output
measure and non-performing loans as a negative output, blends the production and
intermediation approaches. The use of non-interest income as a measure of bank
output is increasingly common as discussed in Casu et al (2004), Isik and Hassan
(2003), Mukherjee et al (2001) and Drake (2001). In China non-interest income
remains a modest contribution to bank revenue but it is increasing in significance. In
1997 non-interest income accounted for only 0.3 per cent of total revenue but by 2006
it was 11.2 per cent. Although small by Western banks standards, the dramatic rise in
fee-generated income in the space of a decade is testimony to the growing importance
of this area of banking business to China.
18
 5. Empirical Results
Tables 4a - d show the estimates of total factor productivity and its
decomposition under CRS for each of the banks in the data set for the full period
1997-2006. As noted in footnote 8, if the production technology is variable returns to
scale (VRS), the Malmquist TFP index can be further decomposed into frontier shift,
pure efficiency change and scale efficiency. The bootstrap algorithm of Simar and
Wilson (1999) uses the conical hull of the observed data to estimate the production
set, which amounts to assuming CRS. However, the Malmquist index provides
consistent estimates of the true value irrespective of the returns to scale assumption
but may give inconsistent results regarding the sources of productivity in the
decomposition. Consequently, the null hypothesis of CRS was tested against the
alternative of VRS for each year using the third test of Banker (1996) in Models 1 and
2, which is a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. Except for the year 2001, the null of CRS
could not be rejected and we proceeded cautiously with the assumption of CRS12.
In this exercise the availability of a full balanced panel meant that only 13
banks were used. The tables also reports the 95% confidence intervals for each
estimate obtained from 1000 bootstrap generations for each bank based on Simar and
Wilson (1999). Appendix C outlines the steps of the bootstrap algorithm. A * by
each estimate denotes that it is significantly biased (outside the standard error band).
The banks have been grouped into the 4 SOBs, the 5 top JSBs and the 5 bottom JSBs.
Tables 4 a-c show that out of 156 estimates of the Malmquist productivity growth and
decomposition, 102 have significant statistical bias. It is clear therefore that little
                                                
12 However, this result must be interpreted with caution in the light of the Monte-Carlo findings of
Simar and Wilson (2002). It was also found that only 5 out 10 years could not reject CRS in models 3
and 4 which compounds the caution relating to the assumption of CRS.
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confidence can be placed on the point estimates of total factor productivity in using
the 4 variants of inputs and outputs.
Table 4a: Productivity Measures, Model 1, Standard error bounds in parenthesis
Bank Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift
Agricultural Bank
of China
0.4621
(0.4363, 0.6859)
0.6296
(0.4300, 0.7389)
0.7341
(0.7305, 1.2099)
Bank of China 1.0621*
(1.3761, 1.7874)
1.5543*
(0.7425, 1.4656)
0.6833*
(0.9278, 2.0212)
China Construction
Bank
0.3116
(0.2545, 0.4180)
0.4436
(0.3050, 0.5217)
0.7024
(0.6215, 1.0199)
Industrial Bank Co
Ltd
0.4894*
(0.7372, 1.3205)
1.0000
(0.6335, 1.6044)
0.4894*
(0.6561, 1.2327)
Bank of
Communication
0.9259
(0.6883, 0.9761)
1.0423*
(0.4715, 0.8599)
0.8883*
(1.0231, 1.5074)
CITIC Industrial
Bank
0.6281*
(1.3119, 2.0213)
1.0000
(0.5361, 1.1254)
0.4894*
(1.3931, 2.7048)
China Merchant
Bank
0.5592*
(0.9006, 1.5268)
1.0000*
(0.4588, 0.9739)
0.5592*
(1.1502, 2.3151)
Shanghai-Pudong
Development Bank
0.5942*
(0.7556, 1.1320)
1.0000
(0.5105, 1.0343)
0.5942*
(0.9303, 1.5676)
China Minsheng
Bank
0.6499*
(0.9083, 1.3805)
1.0000
(0.6441, 1.2821)
0.64992*
(0.9751, 1.4536)
Industrial Bank Co
Ltd
0.4894*
(0.7372, 1.3205)
1.0000
(0.6335, 1.6044)
0.4894*
(0.6561, 1.2327)
Hua Xia Bank 0.7093*
(0.9560, 1.4560)
1.0466
(0.6129, 1.2131)
0.6777*
(1.0582, 1.6218)
Shenzhen
Development Bank
0.2175*
(0.4585,0.7715)
0.4805
(0.3422, 0.7243)
0.4527*
(0.8317, 1.4134)
Guangdong
Development Bank
0.7846*
(0.8366, 1.1353)
0.9739
(0.7654, 1.2902)
0.8056
(0.7992, 1.374)
20
Table 4b: Productivity Measures, Model 2, Standard error bounds in
parenthesis
Bank Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift
Agricultural Bank
of China
1.0036*
(0.8485, 0.9465)
0.9486
(0.8897, 1.0510)
1.0579*
(0.8601, 0.9919)
Bank of China 1.0280
(0.9646, 1.3188)
1.0000
(0.6089, 1.0397)
1.0280*
(1.1270, 1.6736)
China Construction
Bank
1.0431
(0.9046, 1.0864)
1.0602
(1.0069, 1.2527)
0.9839*
(0.7978, 0.9675)
Industrial and
Comm Bank China
1.1170*
(0.8838, 1.0331)
1.0020
(0.8156, 1.0058)
1.1148
(0.9634, 1.1446)
Bank of
Communication
0.9259
(0.6883, 0.9761)
1.0423*
(0.4715, 0.8599)
0.8883*
(1.0231, 1.5074)
CITIC Industrial
Bank
0.6281*
(1.3119, 2.0213)
1.0000
(0.5361, 1.1254)
0.4894*
(1.3931, 2.7048)
China Merchant
Bank
0.7499*
(1.0295, 1.4790)
1.0000
(0.5783, 1.1059)
0.7499*
(1.1757, 1.8527)
Shanghai-Pudong
Development Bank
0.5942*
(0.7556, 1.1320)
1.0000
(0.5105, 1.0343)
0.5942*
(0.9303, 1.5676)
China Minsheng
Bank
0.6499*
(0.9083, 1.3805)
1.0000
(0.6441, 1.2821)
0.64992*
(0.9751, 1.4536)
Industrial Bank Co
Ltd
1.2107
(1.0093, 1.8375)
1.0000*
(0.2596, 0.8031)
1.2107*
(2.0305, 3.4981)
Hua Xia Bank 0.7093*
(0.9560, 1.4560)
1.0466
(0.6129, 1.2131)
0.6777*
(1.0582, 1.6218)
Shenzhen
Development Bank
0.7150*
(0.7507,1.0617)
0.9809
(0.9279, 1.5380)
0.7290
(0.6284, 0.8519)
Guangdong
Development Bank
0.7846*
(0.8366, 1.1353)
0.9739
(0.7654, 1.2902)
0.8056
(0.7992, 1.374)
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Table 4c: Productivity Measures, Model 3, Standard error bounds in
parenthesis.
Bank Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift
Agricultural Bank
of China
0.3847*
(0.3874, 0.6276)
0.5236
(0.3389, 0.6070)
0.7347*
(0.7928, 1.3809)
Bank of China 1.0627*
(1.3868, 1.8048)
1.5543*
(0.7126, 1.4605)
0.6833*
(0.9209, 2.1134)
China Construction
Bank
0.2264
(0.1952, 0.3440)
0.3172
(0.1691, 0.3548)
0.7136*
(0.7498, 1.3435)
Industrial and
Comm Bank China
0.6195*
(0.7269, 1.1843)
0.9258
(0.5826, 1.0977)
0.6691*
(0.8202, 1.4910)
Bank of
Communication
1.0276*
(1.9608, 3.1976)
1.7090*
(0.8470, 1.6662)
0.6013*
(1.4537, 2.7264)
CITIC Industrial
Bank
0.5449*
(1.8324, 2.7091)
1.0000
(0.5347, 1.1527)
0.5449*
(1.7883, 3.8510)
China Merchant
Bank
0.5746*
(0.8876, 1.5353)
1.0000*
(0.4406, 0.9721)
0.5746*
(1.1544, 2.3589)
Shanghai-Pudong
Development Bank
1.7830*
(0.8117, 1.5887)
1.0000*
(0.0225, 0.2021)
1.7830*
(6.1013, 16.9400)
China Minsheng
Bank
0.3847*
(1.2096, 1.9079)
0.8131
(0.4365, 0.9262)
0.4731*
(1.5395, 3.1522)
Industrial Bank Co
Ltd
0.4974*
(0.8627, 1.5605)
1.0000
(0.5769, 1.5683)
0.4974*
(0.7606, 1.571)
Hua Xia Bank 0.4087*
(1.759, 2.7824)
0.9979
(0.5516, 1.1367)
0.4096*
(1.8503, 3.6536)
Shenzhen
Development Bank
0.2194*
(0.4682, 0.8424)
0.4128
(0.2041, 0.5287)
0.5314*
(1.2121, 2.4761)
Guangdong
Development Bank
0.4253*
(0.5894, 1.0280)
0.6073
(0.3294, 0.7123)
0.6345*
(1.0925, 2.0750)
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Table 4d: Productivity Measures, Model 4, Standard error bounds in
parenthesis.
Bank Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift
Agricultural Bank
of China
0.4974*
(0.7083, 0.9396)
0.4461
(0.3099, 0.4644)
1.1151*
(1.754, 2.5327)
Bank of China 1.0280*
(1.1311, 1.8204)
1.0000
(0.6098, 1.0099)
1.0280*
(1.5509, 2.3578)
China Construction
Bank
0.5242*
(0.6633, 0.9885)
0.4251
(0.2239, 0.4551)
1.2332*
(1.8189, 3.1432)
Industrial and
Comm Bank China
0.5205*
(0.5934, 0.8620)
0.3920*
(0.1800, 0.3875)
1.32377*
(1.8985, 3.3426)
Bank of
Communication
0.9442*
(1.0735, 1.6368)
0.9672*
(0.4055, 0.8915)
0.9762*
(1.4834, 2.7995)
CITIC Industrial
Bank
0.8718*
(2.1857, 4.4171)
1.0004
(0.5667, 1.1919)
0.8715*
(2.2100, 5.4806)
China Merchant
Bank
0.7762*
(1.5344, 2.3761)
1.0000
(0.5933, 1.1702)
0.7762*
(1.5909, 2.8590)
Shanghai-Pudong
Development Bank
2.4432
(1.8925, 4.1542)
1.0000*
(-0.0561, 0.4120)
2.4432
(2.0436, 41.644)
China Minsheng
Bank
0.8922*
(1.7427, 3.6739)
1.0000
(0.7186, 1.4233)
0.8922*
(1.6044, 3.5296)
Industrial Bank Co
Ltd
1.2846*
(1.6997, 3.4786)
1.0000*
(0.2804, 0.7386)
1.2846*
(3.7000, 6.6736)
Hua Xia Bank 0.8463*
(1.9575, 3.4540)
1.0547
(0.6823, 1.3436)
0.8024*
(1.7472, 3.7025)
Shenzhen
Development Bank
0.7492*
(1.0595, 2.1492)
0.5636
(0.2986, 0.6328)
1.3294*
(2.0061, 5.0530)
Guangdong
Development Bank
0.6581*
(0.9730, 1.4484)
0.6687
(0.3897, 0.7972)
0.9841*
(1.4231, 2.7491)
Mean estimates were obtained from 1000 bootstrap generations for each pair
of years for the 14 banks for the period 1997-2003 and 13 banks for 2004-2006. To
make the presentation easier, the 14 banks were sub-divided into the big-4 SOBs, the
next largest five banks and the bottom five banks. Tables 5 a  d report the weighted
(by asset share) mean values of the bias adjusted bootstrap estimates of the models 1 
4.
23
 Under the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and
liabilities measure inputs whereas the production approach recognises that the bank
provides intermediation services and payment services to depositors. In the
production approach, physical entities such as labour and capital are inputs while
deposits are a measure of output. Goldschmidt (1981) argues that deposits are both
inputs and outputs depending on its use in intermediation services or payments
services and suggests a weighting mechanism similar to the divisia mechanism of
Barnett (1984). Such a separation would need information about the term maturity of
deposits. This information is not easily available for banks in China and in any case
up until very recently deposit interest rates were regulated and did not reflect market
fundamentals.
This study adopts a mixture of models that blend both the intermediation and
production methods to test the robustness of the measures of bank productivity. The
tables present the Malmquist productivity index, the increase in efficiency (catch-up)
and technical progress for each model with indicators of statistical significance. An
indicator of significance states that the bias-corrected estimate is significantly
different from unity (no change).
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Table 5a: Weighted means of productivity and decomposition. Model 1 Loans
Unadjusted, 2 inputs 4 outputs
Model Year SOB-4 Top-5 JSB Lower-5 JSB
1998/97 1.0474*** 1.3861*** 2.2090***
1999/98 0.9692 1.2426 1.0510
2000/99 0.9058*** 0.9819*** 0.7940***
2001/00 0.8987*** 0.9044*** 0.7840***
2002/01 0.9721*** 1.0741** 0.9207***
2003/02 0.9500*** 0.9787 0.8456***
2004/03 1.0642*** 1.0182 1.3756**
2005/04 1.1154*** 1.1085*** 0.8609***
2006/05 0.8760*** 1.0267 0.9082***
1997/06 0.9409 1.8350*** 1.0949
Model 1
Malmquist
TFP
1998/97 0.9124 1.0034 1.4908*
1999/98 0.9452 1.1260 1.2334
2000/99 1.0980 0.8731 0.6195***
2001/00 0.8275*** 0.9687 0.8937
2002/01 0.8654*** 1.0479 1.0795
2003/02 0.9903 1.1818** 0.9505
2004/03 0.9857 0.9661 0.8777
2005/04 1.3681*** 1.3681 0.9143
2006/05 0.9840 0.9998 0.8815*
1997/06 0.9033 0.9271 0.7994*
Model 1
Efficiency
(Catch-up)
1998/97 1.1726 1.4022** 1.4497**
1999/98 1.0421 1.1467 0.8831
2000/99 0.8708* 1.1677 1.3617**
2001/00 1.0886 0.9553 0.8864
2002/01 1.1364* 1.0920 0.8863
2003/02 0.9720 0.8478 0.8940
2004/03 1.0852 1.0802 3.1427***
2005/04 0.8203*** 1.1873 0.9609
2006/05 0.8996 1.0505 1.0376
Model 1
Technical
Progress
1997/06 1.0271 2.0031*** 1.4296**
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
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Table 5b: Weighted means of productivity and decomposition. Model 2 Loans
Unadjusted, 3 inputs 3 outputs
Model Year SOB-4 Top-5 JSB Lower-5 JSB
1998/97 1.0202** 1.1099*** 1.1557***
1999/98 0.9841 1.0370 1.0490**
2000/99 1.0235 0.9912 1.0032
2001/00 1.0541** 0.8929*** 0.9244***
2002/01 1.0086 1.1093*** 1.0451*
2003/02 0.9721*** 0.9543*** 0.9375***
2004/03 0.9963 1.0349 1.2462
2005/04 0.9854 0.9658 0.9593
2006/05 1.0457*** 1.0029 0.9393***
1997/06 0.9912 1.0240 1.1471
Model 2
Malmquist
TFP
1998/97 1.0405 0.9381 0.9043
1999/98 1.1994*** 1.1455* 1.1022
2000/99 1.0488 0.9010 0.8745**
2001/00 1.0125 0.9869 0.9987
2002/01 0.8162*** 1.0159 1.0708
2003/02 0.9309*** 0.9433 0.9197
2004/03 0.9182** 0.9492 0.7849***
2005/04 0.9648 0.9759 1.1429**
2006/05 1.0176 0.9866 0.9463
1997/06 0.9527 0.7797*** 0.9015
Model 2
Efficiency
(Catch-up)
1998/97 0.9844 1.1927*** 1.4968***
1999/98 0.8301*** 0.9274 0.9632
2000/99 0.9949 1.1197 1.1812***
2001/00 1.0488 0.9106* 0.9324
2002/01 1.2783*** 1.1936*** 0.9829
2003/02 1.0470* 1.0169 1.0224
2004/03 1.12812** 1.1264 4.0554***
2005/04 1.0250 1.0114 0.8581***
2006/05 1.0267 1.0295 1.0020
Model 2
Technical
Progress
1997/06 1.0618 1.3290*** 1.5166***
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
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Table 5c: Weighted means of productivity and decomposition. Model 3 Loans
adjusted, 2 inputs 4 outputs
Model Year SOB-4 Top-5 JSB Lower-5 JSB
1998/97 1.0100*** 1.5740*** 2.1236***
1999/98 0.9720 1.2321*** 1.1266***
2000/99 0.9968 1.0392 0.9340
2001/00 0.9642* 0.8812*** 0.7990***
2002/01 0.9793** 1.0601* 0.9093***
2003/02 0.8831*** 0.9373*** 0.8687***
2004/03 0.9795*** 0.9385** 1.0715***
2005/04 1.0511*** 1.0657*** 0.8861***
2006/05 0.8767*** 1.0450 0.9231**
1997/06 0.8417** 1.9463*** 1.2565**
Model 3
Malmquist
TFP
1998/97 0.8843 1.0907 1.5923**
1999/98 0.6997*** 0.9417 0.8562
2000/99 1.1559 0.9098 0.7959***
2001/00 0.8287*** 0.9444 0.9223
2002/01 0.8870** 1.0569 1.0153
2003/02 1.0111 1.1687*** 0.9818
2004/03 0.9930 0.9019 1.1145
2005/04 1.4162*** 1.0081 0.9886
2006/05 0.9859 1.0115 0.8873
1997/06 0.6838*** 0.8446 0.7248**
Model 3
Efficiency
(Catch-up)
1998/97 1.1748 2.6606*** 1.3130*
1999/98 1.4604*** 1.3542*** 1.3452**
2000/99 0.9022 1.1531 1.1975*
2001/00 1.1664** 0.9460 0.8696*
2002/01 1.1312* 1.1268 0.9308
2003/02 0.8836*** 0.8254*** 0.8896
2004/03 0.9907 1.0559 0.9773
2005/04 0.7441*** 1.0741 0.9055
2006/05 0.8990 1.0573 1.0505
Model 3
Technical
Progress
1997/06 1.1938 3.5628*** 1.8122**
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
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Table 5d: Weighted means of productivity and decomposition. Model 4 Loans
adjusted, 3 inputs 3 outputs
Model Year SOB-4 Top-5 JSB Lower-5 JSB
1998/97 1.0391*** 1.3754*** 1.1822***
1999/98 0.8773*** 1.0900** 1.1222***
2000/99 1.1032*** 1.0970*** 1.2217***
2001/00 0.9939 0.9010*** 0.9312***
2002/01 0.9744*** 1.1029*** 1.2080***
2003/02 0.9518*** 1.0137 0.9672
2004/03 0.9875 0.9834 1.0341
2005/04 0.9715*** 0.9738 0.9351
2006/05 1.0685*** 1.0194 0.9416***
1997/06 0.9510 2.1974*** 2.0477***
Model 4
Malmquist
TFP
1998/97 0.7628*** 0.9536 0.8164*
1999/98 0.9692 1.0873 1.0199
2000/99 0.9187 0.8688* 0.9381
2001/00 0.9613 1.0122 1.0216
2002/01 0.7993*** 1.0862 1.2010***
2003/02 0.9162*** 0.9287 0.8144***
2004/03 0.9973 0.9070 1.0098
2005/04 0.9479** 0.9685 1.1590**
2006/05 1.0294 0.9966 0.9228
1997/06 0.4329*** 0.7152*** 0.6496***
Model 4
Efficiency
(Catch-up)
1998/97 1.5591*** 2.5068*** 1.76969***
1999/98 0.9169 1.0391 1.1148
2000/99 1.2116*** 1.2832*** 1.34073***
2001/00 1.0391 0.9014* 0.9205
2002/01 1.2802*** 1.1168 1.0084
2003/02 1.0438 1.1029* 1.1886***
2004/03 1.0006 1.0955 1.0388
2005/04 1.0289 1.0253 0.8307***
2006/05 1.0374 1.0357 1.0301
Model 4
Technical
Progress
1997/06 2.3739*** 3.3114*** 2.1407**
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
The tables show the movements in productivity growth figures for each year, but the
overall growth for the period 1997-2006 is more revealing. The difference between
model 1 and model 2 is that deposits are treated as an output in model 1 and as an
input in model 2. The ideal composition would have a proportion of demand deposits
as an output (production of payment services) and time deposits as input for
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intermediation services. Therefore we can interpret the results from the two models as
boundary values for actual productivity growth. The figures show that there was
significant productivity growth on the basis of model 1 for the top 5 JSBs driven by
technical progress (frontier shift) but no significant growth in productivity for the
SOBs or the lower 5 JSBs. With model 2, there was no significant growth in overall
productivity for all three groups although there was significant technical progress
outweighed by efficiency regress for the top 5 JSBs.
Models 3 and 4 treat NPLs as an undesirable output and the results are much
clearer once NPLs have been taken out of the picture. The JSBs register strong
productivity growth in the case of model 3, driven by technological progress, whereas
the SOBs show significant productivity regress. With model 4 the JSBs again register
strong productivity growth driven by technological progress (frontier shifts) but also
significant mean efficiency regress. In the case of the SOBs there is strong
productivity regress with model 3 but no significant growth with model 4.
We can interpret the results from Models 3 and 4 in the following way. All the
banks have had some productivity growth driven largely by technological progress.
However, this has favoured the benchmarks banks that have improved productivity
faster than the rest leading to average efficiency regress. Figure 1 below summarises
the performance of the three groups of banks according to the type of model against
the null hypothesis of zero productivity growth (Malmquist index M = 1)
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Figure 1
The bold line indicates the null of zero overall productivity growth (M = 1) for
the full time period 1997-2006 under the assumption of each model. The SOBs show
no significant productivity growth and show a significant productivity regress on the
assumption of model 3, whereby NPLs are treated as a negative output and deposits
are treated as an output. The top 5 JSBs show significant productivity growth in the
case of model 1, model 3 and model 4 while the lower 4 JSBs show significant
productivity growth in the case of model 3 and model 4. The adjustment for NPLs
indicates a marked difference in performance between the SOBs and the JSBs over
the full period. This is not surprising as the SOBs had a larger proportion of NPLs
over this period than the JSBs.
In the case of model 2, we can see from Table 5b that all three groups of banks
do not exhibit significant productivity growth at the 10% level of significance. While
this is consistent with the results for the other three models concerning the SOBs, it is
SOB
Top 5 - JSB
Other JSB
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
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not a consistent result for the JSBs. One possible explanation is that loans growth for
both groups of JSBs matched closely the growth in its deposits13. Thus using deposits
as an input will gravitate the results towards neutrality in the growth of TFP. In the
case of the top 5 JSBs, technical progress using Model 2 is offset by average
efficiency regress. In all 4 models the top 5 JSBs exhibit strong technical progress
which favoured the benchmark banks. In this sense the results are consistent with the
other three models.
However, in the case of the bottom 5 JSBs Table 5b shows that strong
significant technical progress was matched by neutral efficiency gains giving the
implausible result of zero productivity growth (in the statistical sense). However,
according to Simar and Wilson (2000) the bias corrected bootstrap has a mean square
error that is larger than the uncorrected bootstrap, but the gap declines with increased
number of bootstraps. The mean level of TFP growth for the period 1997-2006 for the
lower 5 JSBs was 1.1471 with a lower bound of 0.988 at the 10% level of
significance. The potential for a type 2 error in inference is strong. An increased
number of bootstraps could produce a tighter 90% range where the mean estimate of
TFP will be significantly different from unity which would be consistent with the
decomposition of strong technical progress and zero catch-up.
We now turn to an analysis of the characteristics of productivity growth by
examining its determinants. The raw material of what is to be explained on a yearly
basis is the bootstrap mean value of the Malmquist productivity index for each bank
under the assumption of each of the models 1-4. Table 6 shows some selected results
from panel corrected heteroskedastic adjustment14. The bank specific variables are;
                                                
13 The top 5 JSBs had average loan growth of 17.8% and deposit growth of 18.7% and for the lower 5
JSBs the figures were 21.0% and 21.7% respectively. The SOBs experienced a fall in the loan-deposit
ratio from 73% to 54%.
14 The standard fixed effects model was rejected on conventional F test for each of the models.
31
LSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, COST is the cost-income ratio, SOB is a
dummy variable for state-owned banks, FOR is the foreign ownership stake given by
Table 2, FEE is the proportion of revenue from net fees and commissions, IPO is a
dummy variable for the year of the bank listing on the domestic stock exchange.
Table 6: Dependant variable: Malmquist productivity index. Panel
heteroskedastic adjusted standard errors; No: of obs=123, No: of groups=14.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 3.51*** 2.38*** 1.83*** 1.71*** 3.49*** 2.45*** 2.07*** 1.99***
LSIZE -.19* -.11*** -.06*** -.06*** -.19* -.11** -.08*** .08***
COST -.003 - -.001 - -.001 - -.001 -
SOB .315 - .152** .133** .312 - .133 .128
FOR .017** .015*** .007*** .007*** .010 .008* .002 .002
FEE .018*** .019*** .002* .002*** .016*** .017*** .003* .003**
IPO -.129 -.152 .004 - -.146** -.176** -.020 -
R-sq 0.1505 0.1310 0.1185 0.1078 0.1757 0.1533 0.1362 .1316
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
The two consistent determinants for all four models is size, measured by total
assets, and the composition of revenue. The sign on the variable LSIZE suggests that
the larger the bank, the lower the growth in productivity. An indicator of managerial
flexibility and capability to diversify output is given by the composition of earnings
from off-balance sheet sources. The sign on FEE suggests that the greater the
composition of fee income in revenue, the greater the productivity growth. There is
weak evidence that foreign financial institutional shareholding is associated with
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higher productivity growth but this affect is weakened when NPLs are treated as an
undesirable output. There is no evidence that productivity growth is obtained through
cost reduction and there is little evidence that state-owned banks have a productivity
advantage. The extension of ownership from state and local government to the
domestic public through listing on the domestic exchanges has had mostly no
statistical effect on productivity. Where significant, this variable enters with a
negative sign.
6.0  Conclusion
This paper has used the Malmquist decomposition to quantify the productivity
growth of Chinese banks in 1997-2006. The advantage of use the Malmquist method
is that it separates the diffusion of technology (efficiency gains) from advances in
technology (frontier shifts). The paper also applies bootstrapping techniques to
evaluate significant changes in productivity, efficiency gains and innovation. In
common with many other studies of Chinese banks, we find that in general the
performance of the JSBs outstrip the SOBs.
Using deposits as an output, only the top 5 JSBs showed significant
productivity gains driven by strong technological advances over this period. When
deposits are treated as an input, productivity growth is zero with technological gains
being offset by average efficiency regress. But there is weak evidence that technical
progress in the bottom 5 JSBs is translated into positive TFP growth.
Once NPLs are treated as an undesirable output the picture becomes clearer.
At best there is on average no productivity growth for the SOBs and at worst, there is
average productivity regress. Technological gains have been swamped by average
efficiency losses. However, the JSBs show strong productivity growth driven by
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spectacular innovation effects. While adopting technologies that improved the
productivity of the average JSB, the average JSB failed to keep up with the
benchmark banks and moved further away from the frontier. Treating the different
models as boundary values the story is that at best the SOBs experienced zero
productivity growth and at worst experienced productivity regress, whereas the JSBs
at best experienced strong productivity growth and at worst experienced zero
productivity growth.
An econometric analysis confirms that the larger banks had lower productivity
growth than smaller banks. This may be explained by the political and social
opposition the SOBs face in attempting to restructure factor inputs and downsize as a
means of improving performance. It also explains the concentration of the activity of
the Asset Management Companies on the SOBs in aiding the divestiture of their large
NPL holdings. Higher productivity growth was also associated with banks that had
diversified into non-interest earnings activity. The higher the proportion of revenue
from non-interest earnings indicates greater management flexibility and an increase in
the productivity of the banks.
The results obtained are necessarily backward looking and describe the
evolution of the Chinese banking system in the decade to 2006. The market share (of
assets) of the SOBs has fallen from 89% in 1997 to 51% in 2006 and the remarkable
growth of the JSBs is reflected in their productivity performance. However, it should
be borne in mind that this represents the growth phase of the JSBs and may not be
sustained once the banks reach the maturity phase.
The analysis also revealed weak evidence that the stronger the foreign
financial institutional stake in the bank, the greater the productivity growth of the
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bank. However, as Appendix A shows, this aspect is relatively recent in the sample
frame and until further data is available, requires a cautious assessment.
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Appendix A
Table 1A: Foreign Bank Ownership Stake
Chinese Bank Foreign Bank Stake  first acquisition
Bank of Beijing ING 19.2% - Aug 2007
Bank of Shanghai HSBC (8%) and other
foreign institutions
18.0% - Dec 2001
Shanghai Pudong
Development Bank
Citigroup(4.6%), Barclays, J
P Morgan, Morgan Stanley
5.3% -  Dec 2003
Tianjin City Commercial
Bank
ANZ 20% - July 2006
Industrial Bank Hang Seng (12.8%), Tetrad
Ventures
20.8% - April 2004
Bank of Communications HSBC (19.9%), Barclays, J
P Morgan,
21.5% - June 2004
Xian City Comm. Bank Scotia Bank 12.4% - Oct 2004
Jinan City Comm. Bank C Bank of Australia 11% - Nov 2004
Shenzen Develop. Bank Seahaven (17.9%), Barclays,
Nikko Asset Management
19.3% - Dec 2004
China Minsheng Bank Fullerton (7.9%), Barclays, J
P Morgan
8.9% - Jan 2005
Hangzhou City Com Bank C Bank of Australia 19.9% - June 2007
China Construction Bank Bank of America (8.5%)
Fullerton, Other foreign
15.2% - June 2005
Bank of China RBS-China(8.3%),
Fullerton, Other foreign
20.6% - Aug 2005
ICBC Goldman Sachs, Allianz,
American Express
10% - Aug 2005
Nanjing City Com. Bank BNP Paribas 19.2% - Oct 2005
China Bohai Bank Standard Charter Bank 20.0% - Dec 2006
Guangdong Development
Bank
Citigroup (20%), IBM 24.7% - Dec 2006
Hua Xia Bank Deutsche bank (9.9%)
Sal Oppenheim Jr
14.0% - Oct 2005
   Source: Business Week October 31, 2005 and Fitch Bankscope
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Appendix B
Figure 1B
Points A and B represent observations in periods t and t+1 respectively. The rays
from the origin St and St+1 represent frontiers of production for periods t and t+1
respectively. Relative efficiency is measure in one of two ways. The relative
efficiency of production of a firm at point A compared to the frontier St is described
by the distance function dt(yt,xt) = 0a/0b. But compared with the period t+1 frontier
St+1, it is dt+1(yt,xt) = 0a/0c. The relative efficiency of production of a firm at point B
compared to the period t+1 frontier St+1 is dt+1(yt+1,xt+1) = 0d/0e. Compared with the
period t frontier St, the relative efficiency is dt(yt+1,xt+1) = 0d/0c.
y
x
St frontier at time t
St+1 frontier at time t+1
A
xt xt+1
e
yt+1=d
c
b
yt=a
0
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Appendix C
The estimates of the distance functions for N banks over 2 periods are obtained
following the standard method outlined in Färe et al (1992) for ( )titit xyd ,, ,  and
( )1,1,1 , +++ titit xyd . As in Simar and Wilson (1998) a DGP is assumed whereby the N
banks randomly deviate from the underlying true frontier in a radial input direction.
Bootstrapping involves replicating the DGP and generating 1000 pseudo samples
which are used to measure the distance function for either period for each observation
in the pseudo sample. This section borrows heavily from Jeon and Sickles (2004)
Step 1: Form (N x 1) vectors [ ]),()....,(),,( ,,,2,2,1,1 tNtNttttttt xydxydxyd=Α   and
[ ]),()....,(),,( 1,1,11,21,211,11,11 +++++++++=Β tNtNttttttt xydxydxyd . The values in A and B are
bounded from below at unity.
Step 2: Reflect these values about the boundaries in two-dimensional space to form
(4N x 2) matrix in partitioned form;
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−−
−
=∆
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
2
22
2
The matrix ∆ contains 4N pairs of values corresponding to the two time periods. The
estimated covariance matrix of the columns [A B] is Σ which is the same as that of
the reflected data [2  A   2  B], given by the temporal correlation of the original
data. The covariance matrix of [2  A  B] and [A  2  B] is RΣ , where;
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
=Σ 2
212
12
2
1


σσ
σσ
 and ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
=Σ 2
212
12
2
1


σσ
σσ
R
Let j∆ denote the jth row of ∆. Then ∑
=
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛ ∆−
=
N
j
j
j h
z
K
Nh
zg
4
1
24
1)(  is a bivariate
kernel density estimator of the 4N reflected data points represented by the rows of ∆,
where K(.) is the bivariate kernel function, h is a bandwidth set to (4/5N)1/6 following
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Silverman (1986) and z is (1 x 2) )],(),,([ 111 +++= itittititti xydxydz  is the ith row of the
(N x 2) matrix of the original distance function estimates.
Step 3: Randomly draw with replacement N rows from ∆ to form (N x 2) matrix
][ ,
*
jiδ=∆ , i=1,2,.N, j=1,2.
Step 4:  Compute
∑
=
=
N
i
jiNj
1
,
1 δδ , j = 1, 2
Step 5: Simulate draws from a bivariate ( )Σ,,0N  and ( )RN Σ,0  by generating iid
pseudo random N(0,1) deviates ),( 21 zz  s.t. ),( 232211 zlzlzl + from ( )Σ,,0N  and
),( 231211 zlzlzl +− from ( )RN Σ,0 . Here 321 ,, lll  are elements of a lower triangular
matrix
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
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1 0
ll
l
L  obtained from the Cholesky decomposition of the
(2 x 2) matrix Σ . These simulated draws form ε* which is (N x 2) containing
independent draws from the kernel function. If *j∆ is drawn from [A B] or [2  A  2 -
B], the ith row of ε*  is from ( )Σ,,0N , but if ε* is drawn from [2  A B] or [A 2  B],
the ith row of ε* is from ( )RN Σ,0 .
Step 6: Compute (N x 2) matrix
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−+∆+=Γ
−
2.
1.
2.
1.**2
12
0
0
0
0
)1(
δ
δ
δ
δ
ε CChh  where C is (N x 1) of
unit values which gives a (N x 2) of bivariate deviates from the estimated density of ∆
and ε* is an (N x 2) containing N independent draws from the kernel function Kj(.).
Step 7: For each element of ji ,γ  of Γ set; 1,*, ≥= jiji γγ  or ji,2 γ−  otherwise. The (N
x 2) matrix ][ *,
*
jiγ=Γ  contains simulated distance function values.
Step 8: Pseudo samples *λ  are then constructed by setting
),(/,
*
,
*
, ititttijijit xydxx γ= and jitjit yy ,*, =  for i = 1, 2, ..N and j = 1,2.
Step 9: Compute the four distance functions;
 ),(),,(),,(),,( * 1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
****
1
***
++++++ itittitittitittititt xydxydxydxyd . Repeat steps 3 to 9 1000 times
to get a set of 1000 bootstrap estimates.
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